אלאפיניש אדם

My research proposes political corruption as a universal variable for predicting government religious discrimination (GRD) and governments’ support for religion—that is support for a religious monopoly—using the perception of corruption in the public sector as an independent variable for predicting these government policies. My basic argument is that corrupt states are more likely to support a religious monopoly because corrupt states have a greater need to boost legitimacy by endorsing religious leaders. A religious monopoly—a situation where one religion is dominant often due to government support—can serve this purpose, and, in exchange, religious monopolies are more likely to seek to conserve their status by regulating and restricting other religious groups in the religious market. It is worth noting that the regulator who needs legitimacy has the capacity to impose religious discrimination against religious minority groups as part of its support for a religious monopoly and thus, both regulator and religious majority benefit from such dynamics in the market. 

Research interest: The economics of religion, religious policy, politics and religion.